Policy Issues for the Water and Sanitation Sectors by Vivien Foster










August 1996—No. IFM96-101Vivien Foster is an Economic Consultant at Oxford Economic Research
Associates Ltd. (OXERA), in the United Kingdom.  Ms. Foster specializes in
the economic and environmental regulation of privatized utilities, with specific
reference to the water industry.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
position of the Inter-American Development BankContents
Executive Summary i
Introduction 1
The Infrastructure Problem 1
Separating Poachers and Gamekeepers
The Depoliticization of Management










In devising policy for Latin America’s environmental management, private sector
infrastructure sector, it is important to participation, investment finance,  regulatory
distinguish between the problems afflicting the control, and social policy.
sector, and their fundamental causes. The
hypothesis put forward in this paper is that these Analysis of the role of competition for the market
fundamental causes can be characterized as the suggests that experiments to date have been
failure to separate poachers from gamekeepers, largely confined to the metropolitan areas of the
and the politicization of management. larger countries in the region, where economic
With the noteworthy exception of certain “flag- favorable. As privatization experiments are
ship” public sector providers of water services, extended to smaller countries and rural areas, it
Latin America’s water and sanitation sector will be important to evaluate the extent to which
shows moderate but highly heterogeneous rates privatization can actually bring about sectoral
of connection, and low levels of operational improvements, rather than simply necessitating
efficiency and cost recovery. them as a prerequisite for its successful
The key distinguishing characteristics of the
water and sanitation sector relative to other As far as social policy is concerned, the analysis
public utilities are identified as the low ratio of suggests that even those countries which are not
value to transportation costs making for highly being compelled to reconsider their social policy
fragmented distribution networks; the virtual as a result of some privatization initiative would
absence of any scope for direct competition in the nonetheless benefit from fundamental reforms.
market; and the strong social character of the Such reforms should be based on the answers to
service as a result of positive social and negative three key questions regarding the objectives of
environmental externalities in consumption. social policy; the sources of funding and the
Building on the analysis of the sector’s empirical evidence to suggest that traditional
distinguishing characteristics, the key economic social policy has focused excessively on the issue
issues facing the industry in Latin America are: of affordability to existing users, at the expense
the degree of centralization of the operations; the of promoting access to those not yet connected to
extent to which competition for the market can be the network.
effectively used to improve sector conditions; and
the scope for reform of social policy toward the Finally, any country contemplating a reform of
consumption of water and sanitation services. its water and sanitation sector should bear in
As far as the optimal horizontal structure of the advance of ownership issues; privatization
industry is concerned, the analysis suggests that measures should be considered as lying on a
this is a multidimensional question, which goes continuum as opposed to constituting an all-or-
beyond the traditional considerations of nothing choice; and regulation is likely to play a
operational and managerial efficiency to role, even where privatization measures are not
encompass the wider issues associated with considered feasible or desirable.
and sectoral conditions are comparatively
implementation.
instruments of implementation. There is some
mind that structural issues must be settled in1
Introduction
The decade of the 1990s is witnessing something discussion paper aims to identify those particular
of a revolution in the modes of provision of  features of the water and sanitation sector which
traditionally state-owned infrastructure services distinguish it from other infrastructure services
throughout the developing world. The Latin and which will consequently merit special
American and Caribbean region has been at the attention by countries engaging in such reforms.
forefront of these developments, with a number
of countries initiating comprehensive, radical and The paper is structured along the following lines:
often very innovative public service reform
programs.  < The second section provides a generic
These experiments in restructuring, privatization facing state-owned providers of public
and regulation have often begun—and proceeded services.
furthest—in the power and telecommunications
sectors. Owing to their technological and < The third section provides an overview
economic characteristics, these sectors present of the water and sanitation sector in
the greatest scope for the emergence of a Latin America and identifies the special
competitive market and are often the most characteristics which distinguish water
attractive to private sector capital. However, a and sanitation from other infrastructure
number of countries have also been taking services.
concrete steps to extending such reforms to the
water and sanitation sector, often regarded as the < The fourth section discusses policy
most quintessentially public of the public responses to three key economic issues:
services.  optimal sector structure, the scope for
Given the importance of water and sanitation policy.
loans in the Bank’s portfolio of infrastructure
projects and the significance of the measures that < The fifth section draws out the main
are underway throughout the region, this conclusions from the discussion.
overview of the institutional problems
privatization, and the redesign social
The Infrastructure Problem
Any policy package aimed at improving public  increasing degree of consensus in recent years
services in Latin America and the Caribbean (Blanlot, 1995; Dussan, 1995)
needs to be based on a sound theoretical
understanding of the problems which have One of the key features of Figure 1 is that it
traditionally afflicted the infrastructure sectors. attempts to distinguish between the causes of the
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of one such problem and their ultimate consequences or, to
hypothesis which has been attracting an use a medical analogy, between the underlying2
Figure 1: A Model of State-Owned Enterprise Failure
disease and its external symptoms. The symp- commercial criteria as a result of
toms exhibited by the infrastructure sector in the external influences from government. 
region are familiar enough.  There are
insufficient investment, poor quality of service, The argument depicted in Figure 1 is that these
low tariff levels, low levels of efficiency, and two institutional defects—by preventing 
lack of accountability to customers. Historically, effective oversight, softening the budget
there has been a tendency to direct efforts toward constraint of the enterprise, and diluting
attacking these superficial symptoms of the efficiency incentives—serve to bring about the
problem, often by relying on direct technical familiar range of problems affecting the public
assistance. However, more recently there has provision of infrastructure services.
been a growing recognition that such
interventions are likely to be ineffectual unless There is obviously room for discussion 
they are preceded by more fundamental reforms regarding the precise specification of the model,
which attempt to rectify the problem at the level and indeed the diagrammatic representation
of underlying causes. The two underlying causes presented above is intended to be suggestive
identified here are: rather than definitive. However, what is clear is
< the poacher–gamekeeper problem: that guide reform measures in this area. Based on the
is, the confusion or juxtaposition of two fundamental causes identified here, the
regulatory and operational roles in state- following subsections examine the practical
owned enterprises; and strategies available to address the problems of
< the politicization of management: that is,
the tendency to base decisions on
political rather than technical or
that some model of this nature is required to
separating roles and depoliticizing management.3
Distinct Roles Type of Provision Level of Provision
Sector Strategy Public Central
Social Policy Public Central
Regulation Public Central or Local
Investment Public or Private Central or Local
Operations Public or Private Central or Local
Table 1: The Separation of Roles
Separating Poachers and Gamekeepers
The process of the separation of roles entails
three distinct stages, which are summarized in
Table 1, as follows:
< the identification of the different roles
that exist (see column one);
< the allocation of these roles between the
private and public sectors (see column
two); and
< the allocation of these roles between
different tiers of government (see column
three).
Since the second and third issues will receive
more extensive comment below, the discussion
here focuses on the question of identifying the
separate roles. This may not be straightforward
when they have been blurred for some time
within a single institution. Table 1 attempts to be
comprehensive in identifying five key roles,
though some countries have taken the separation
process further by distinguishing between the
formulation of regulatory rules and their en-
forcement. An example is the Colombian water
sector, where the former function is undertaken
by a sector-specific regulatory commission (Co-
misión Reguladora de Agua), and the latter by a
cross-sectoral superintendency (Superintenden-
cia de Servicios Públicos).
In addition to the need to separate the first three
quintessentially public sector roles from the last
two roles which might potentially be discharged
by the private sector, a question arises as to
whether each of the five functions should be
allocated to a separate institution within the
corresponding sector. In practice, this is a
question of whether operations should be
separated from investment within the sphere of
service provision, and whether strategy,
regulation and social policy should be separated
from each other and overseen by government.
In the case of the service provision function,
there are examples both of:
< public sector operations complemented
by private sector investment via build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contracts; and
< private sector operations complemented
by public sector investment finance,















Private Provision High Present
Table 2: The Range of Available Institutions
While it may not always be feasible to discharge However, where the three roles identified are
both of these aspects of service provision within institutionally separated, it is important to ensure
the same institutional context, experience with an adequate degree of coordination between the
lease contracts particularly suggests that it may relevant government entities.
be highly desirable to do so.  The examples of
water lease contracts in Guinea and the Ivory
Coast illustrate the serious coordination 
problems that may arise when investments are
undertaken by a public sector investment finance
agency and operations are in the hands of a
private operator, potentially leading to an
inefficient configuration of capital investments
(OXERA/World Bank, 1995).
In the case where government is the overseer, to
the extent that the three facets of strategy,
regulation and social policy entail mutually
conflicting considerations, there may be some
virtue in allocating them to different arms of
government. While it is not unusual for strategic
issues to be retained by government and
regulation to be delegated to an autonomous
agency, it is less common for social policy to be
explicitly hived off from other aspects of water
sector oversight. An interesting example of this is
the Chilean direct subsidy scheme which was
introduced as part of that country’s national
water sector reform process.
The Depoliticization of Management
Table 2 illustrates the range of institutional
options for the provision of infrastructure
services that have been adopted throughout the
continent. 
Historically, in Latin America, water services
have often been provided directly by government
agencies, though there has been a trend towards
the creation of autonomous corporatized state-
owned entities (Blanlot, 1995). In countries such
as Colombia, the hybrid approach of mixed
private/public sector enterprises has also been
adopted. While elsewhere, such as in Bolivia,
user-owned cooperatives have proved to be a
successful vehicle for the provision of public
services. More recently a number of countries
have begun to experiment with private sector
involvement.
A key question is how far along the spectrum
from private to public provision it is necessary5
to go before an effective depoliticization of Although the intermediate institutional models
management is achieved. The answer is likely to may be successful in achieving some measure of
depend on the nature of the political system in depoliticization within the public sector, they do
each country. In some cases, it may be that the not of themselves ensure that efficiency
radical solution of private sector participation is incentives will be introduced. Only under the
the only way to break the political hold over cooperative framework (where there is a close
water and sanitation services. However, there is a identification between the interests of
danger that a country may not be able to commit management and the interests of customers), or
to a credible and autonomous regulatory under privatization (where there is a close
framework, thereby reintroducing political identification between the interests of
pressures under a different guise even where management and the interests of shareholders)
private sector participation has been espoused. will a clear incentive for efficient managerial
behavior arise.
Characterization of the
Latin American Water Sector
A Sectoral Overview
Turning now to the special features of the water
and sanitation sector, and the specific
circumstances of that sector in Latin America
and the Caribbean, Table 3 provides a number of
overview statistics. The table yields four key
insights.
First, the average water and sewerage connection
rates for the region are moderately high, but may
overstate the true position when one takes into
account the incidence of extreme quality of
service deficiencies (with respect to potability
and continuity); and the prevalence of relatively
basic versions of the two services (such as septic
tanks which make up 31% of urban sewerage
provision, or standpipes which constitute 11% of
urban water provision).
Second, the average connection rates hide a
considerable degree of diversity in the levels of
access between: urban and rural sectors (with the
latter lagging 20 to 40 percentage points behind
the former); different countries (ranging from
universal coverage to minority coverage); and
diverse social strata (with differences in
connection rates sometimes in excess of 50
percentage points between the highest and lowest
income quintiles within a particular country).
Third, only a small proportion (10%) of the
region’s wastewater undergoes treatment.
Fourth, The operational indicators illustrate the
low level of efficiency of water and sewerage
provision with unaccounted for water at up to
three times the rate prevalent in OECD countries;
and labor-based efficiency indicators up to six
times the levels prevalent in OECD countries.
Fifth, the proportion of operating costs covered
by water tariffs for those countries for which
data is available is as low as 27%, indicating the
magnitude of the political problems which are
likely to arise when attempting to raise tariffs to
cost recovery levels.6
Average Low High
Water Connection Rates 80% 8% 100%
Urban 89% -- --
Rural 57% -- --
Sewerage Connection Rates 67% 30% 100%
Urban 80% -- --
Rural 34% -- --
Proportion of Supplies from Groundwater 50% -- --
Proportion of Wastewater Treated 5%-10% -- --
Unaccounted for Water 40%-60% 34% --
Cost Recovery Rate 27%-43% -- --
Employees per 1000 Connections 10-20 5 --
Salaries as % of Total Cost >50% <40%
Sources: Blanlot, 1995; PAHO, 1994; Yepes, 1990.
Table 3: Overview Statistics
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the < adequate tariff levels based on the
water and sanitation sector in Latin America principle of cost recovery;
presents a uniformly gloomy panorama. There
have been some notable success stories for water < stability of tenure in managerial posts;
utilities operating within the public sector, which
are worthy of study and emulation. Yepes (1990) < the existence of good cost accounting
identifies a sample of the leading water utilities in systems;
Latin America whose performance on a variety
of efficiency indicators lies closer to the OECD < the use of private subcontractors; and
average than to the average for the rest of the
Latin American continent. They are: from < a strong customer focus.
Colombia, ACUAVALLE (Cali) and EPM
(Medellin); from Mexico, CAD (Monterrey);
from Brazil, COPASA (Minas Gerais); and from
Chile, EMOS (Santiago). 
The study attempts to identify some of the sense of pride and ‘ownership’ within the local
common features of these companies which community. It seems probable that it is such
explain their superior performance, and stresses intangibles which lie at the root of the success 
in particular the importance of the following of these enterprises, and that the various features
characteristics: of the institutions outlined above are 
However, many commentators, including 
Yepes, have emphasized the existence of a 
strong institutional culture, encompassing both a 
high degree of professionalism among staff and a7
Issue Economic Dimension Political Dimension
Horizontal Structure Fragmented Networks Municipal Control
Responsibility for Provision Limited Scope for Competition Desire to Retain Public Sector
Control
Social Policy Health/Environmental Externalities Strong Ideological Character
Table 4: Special Features of the Water Sector
the outward manifestations rather than the mented municipal provision (as is often the case
underlying causes of this success. This in Colombia). 
observation has important implications for the
possibility of replicating these experiences The possibility of adopting a highly 
elsewhere. decentralized model of provision is derived 
Special Features
From this sectoral overview, it is possible to
identify three special features of the water and
sanitation sector which set it apart from other
public service industries. These special features
have both an economic and a political dimension,
as highlighted in Table 4.
First, unlike other public services,  the vertical
structure of the water and sanitation sector is a
relatively uncontentious issue, with the majority
of countries adopting a vertically integrated
approach to the provision of clean and dirty
water services. This structure is quite readily
justified both on the grounds of internalizing the
environmental externalities associated with the
discharge of sewage, and of sanctioning the
nonpayment of sewerage services which cannot
be disconnected (Blanlot, 1995).
However, the horizontal structure of the
industry exhibits an extremely wide degree of
variation across countries, ranging from single
nationwide entities (for example, IDAAN in
Panama), to large regional enterprises (such as
the regional water companies in Chile), to frag-
from the technological characteristics of water
networks themselves. Specifically the relatively
low unit value of water relative to its costs of
transportation prevents the construction of a
large integrated national transmission grid as is
commonplace in the electricity industry, and
tends to produce instead a set of highly
fragmented local distribution networks. These
technological features are often reflected
politically in a history of municipal control of
the sector. For example, the new Colombian
constitution explicitly places the responsibility
for these services in the hands of the
municipalities. Thus, the major structural issue in
any reform of the water and sanitation sector is
to identify the appropriate degree of
decentralization in any particular case.
Second, the technological characteristics of the
water and sanitation sector which tend to 
produce the fragmentation of distribution
networks tend also to preclude the development
of competition in the market. The model of
electricity generation plants competing to
produce electricity through a pool mechanism,
cannot plausibly be applied to the case of water
treatment plants. An important reason for this is
that the fragmentation of distribution networks8
limits the number of economically efficient way of introducing private-sector participation
treatment plants that can be built to supply any into a sector which often presents a relatively
particular conurbation. A further complication is unattractive commercial environment to the
that water, unlike electricity, is not an private investor. 
homogeneous product. Thus, any
implementation of third party network access
would require careful monitoring of the quality 
of the water that was being delivered into the
distribution system. 
Consequently, discussions of the role for
competition in the water sector have tended to
confine themselves to the mechanism of
competition for the market. Such an approach to
the development of competition has the further
advantage of retaining the ownership, or at least
the ultimate ownership, of water and sanitation
infrastructure within the public sector. This can
be politically attractive, when the only other
privatization alternative is the creation of a
privatized monopoly via a sale of assets (along
the lines of that which has been undertaken in
England and Wales). Moreover, in many
developing countries it may be the only feasible
Third, water and sanitation services are often
identified as having the strongest social
characteristics of any of the public utility
industries. In economic terms, this is a result of
the significant externalities associated with the
use of such services, which can be both positive
(in terms of public health benefits) and negative
(in terms of environmental degradation). In
addition, the fundamental need for water as a
basis for human survival, and the acute
competition for the resource in arid countries,
have combined to make access to water a highly
political issue. As a result, the disconnection of
the water service is often considered socially
unacceptable, and in some countries (for
example, Mexico) has been made illegal. This
feature of the sector can often come into conflict




As noted above, the water and sanitation sector
displays a wide degree of horizontal forms of
organization across countries. The consideration
of the optimal horizontal structure of the industry
has traditionally only been considered in the
narrow economic context of economies of scale
as reflected in the technological cost structures
facing the industry. Hence, the focus has been on
operational and managerial efficiency. 
Even on these relatively narrow criteria there is
some disagreement as to where the minimum
efficient scale lies, and much seems to depend 
on whether the question is posed at the plant 
level or at the level of the overall business unit.
For Latin America, Yepes (1990) presents
evidence of continuously improving efficiency
levels over a range of population served from
10,000 to 1,000,000.
However, it seems likely that many of the
efficiency gains associated with serving larger
units come from the economies of density 
arising in large conurbations. Thus, one cannot
necessarily infer from such data that it would be
optimal for the provision of dispersed rural9
Consideration Criterion for Determining Optimal Scale
Operational Efficiency Volume Supplied>Minimum Efficient Scale
Managerial Efficiency Minimize Management Costs per Unit Volume
Environmental Preservation Scope of Hydrographic Basin
Private Participation Minimum Size of Commercially Viable Unit
Investment Finance Minimize Cost of Capital
Regulatory Control Feasibility of Overseeing Number of Enterprises
Social Solidarity Adequate Basis for Cross-Subsidy
Table 5: The Multiple Dimensions of Optimal Scale
communities to be agglomerated in the same  both abstraction and discharge. This raises the
way. need either to internalize these externalities by
The purpose of this section is to broaden the hydrographic boundaries, or at least to base the
debate on the optimal structure of the water and regulation of abstractions and discharges on a
sanitation sector by acknowledging the  holistic view of the river basin. 
existence of a number of other important
considerations which should influence the  The concept of integrated river basin
choice of sector structure. In practice, each of management was the guiding principle behind 
these different considerations may point to a the reorganization of the water sector in 
different degree of centralization or England and Wales in 1973, forming, from a
decentralization. Thus, there may be no unique large number of dispersed municipal providers,
answer to the question of optimal scale, ten water authorities based around the major
necessitating a prioritization between the river basins. Whether or not the hydrographic
different dimensions of the problem, or possibly unit should be the driving consideration in
the allocation of different aspects of sectoral determining the optimal sector structure in Latin
activity to different institutions each with its  America will depend upon a number of
own optimal geographical scope of jurisdiction. considerations:
These multiple dimensions of optimal scale are
summarized in Table 5. < population density, and the geographic
Perhaps the most obvious additional facet of the the major hydrographic features of the
optimal structure of the water and sanitation country, which will affect the degree of
sector is the issue of environmental  environmental tension between water
management and protection. Unlike the other users;
public utility services, the water and sanitation
sector is essentially a man-made adjunct to the < the size and distribution of river basins
natural water cycle whose geographical basis is relative to intranational and in-
the hydrographic basin. Water users within a ternational political boundaries, and to
particular hydrographic basin will necessarily
impose externalities upon each other in terms of
organizing the industry according to
dispersion of the population relative to10
the overall size of the country, which undertaken at different levels of geographical
may affect the administrative feasibility scope: the capital city only, the major
of implementing this principle; and conurbations and the entire country. An
< the availability of resources for solving the period of the National Water Plan 
water use conflicts through regulatory (1974–87), which attempted to extend the
mechanisms; where there is limited experience of successful private sector water
regulatory capacity the resolution of provision in the metropolitan area to the rural
these conflicts via the internalization of areas of the country, suggests that there may be
the externalities may be a relatively considerable problems associated with such
attractive approach. wide-scale privatization measures
A second consideration surrounds the issue of
private sector participation. Any policy toward
privatization of the water sector ought to take
place in the context of a holistic view of the
ultimate scope for such measures at a national
level. In devising such a national policy toward
private sector involvement, it is important to bear
in mind the following two points: 
< there will, in general, be a minimum
viable size of contract for private sector
involvement, given the significant fixed
costs associated with bidding for a
franchise award; and
< it is likely that many parts of the water
and sanitation sector will not present
sufficiently attractive business units for
private investors, unless they are
parceled together with more
commercially viable areas of service.
In combination, these two considerations point
towards the danger of cherry-picking, that is,
creating islands of private sector participation,
and leaving a rump of commercially undesirable
areas to be covered by a public sector provider.
If such a situation is to be avoided, then the
geographical scope of the units of privatization
must be carefully considered in advance, even if
specific privatization measures are inevitably
likely to proceed on a sequential and piecemeal
basis. The experience of water lease contracts
and concessions in West Africa offers some
examples of water privatization measures
experiment undertaken in the Ivory Coast during
(OXERA/World Bank, 1995).
A third consideration concerns the cost of
investment finance. Where all investment is
funded from public or international funds at
preferential rates, the cost of capital may bear 
no relationship to the size of the operation. 
However, where there is an increasing move
toward private investment finance, whether
through concessions or BOT schemes the size of
the business unit may have a significant impact
on the cost of capital at which the private
investor is able to borrow. In a capital intensive
industry requiring high levels of investment, this
effect may have significant cost implications,
linking back to the issue of commercial viability
discussed above.
A fourth consideration is the interaction between
industry structure and the structure of economic
regulation. This issue is certainly relevant where
privatization measures have been adopted, but
may also be of interest in countries which are
developing arm’s length regulatory regimes
within the context of continued public sector
provision, for example, in Colombia. As with
industry structure there are two extreme models
of regulatory structure:
< the French model, which has regulation
by contract occurring at the level of
individual municipalities; and
< the British model, which has regulation
by licence implemented by a centralized
regulatory agency.11
Given the scarcity of regulatory resources, A final issue is the optimal structure from the
particularly at the municipal level, several point of view of achieving social objectives, in
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean particular via the implementation of a cross-
have pursued the British model creating a subsidy schemes. If social policy is to be
number of centralized regulatory agencies such implemented purely within the boundaries of a
as: the Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios particular operational entity, then it becomes
(SSS) in Chile; the Superintendencia Nacional important that the geographical scope of that
de Servicios Sanitarios (SNSS) in Peru; and the entity provides an adequate social base for cross-
Comisón Reguladora de Agua (CRA) in subsidization, that is by encompassing both low-
Colombia. The position in Argentina is somewhat and high-income areas. This becomes less of a
different with the agency Ente Tripartito de constraint if it is possible for the government to
Obras y Servicios Sanitarios (ETOSS) having operate a system of grants between entities,
jurisdiction over the water concession for Buenos whereby those operating in relatively high-
Aires, and the provincial governments dealing income areas pay into a central fund which can
with regulation of provincial water concessions. then be redistributed to entities operating in
Where the centralized model is adopted, it is
important to consider the optimum number of
entities for the process of regulation.
On the one hand, it is important that there be a
sufficient number of distinct providing entities to
allow the regulator to undertake cost
comparisons between them, thereby facilitating
yardstick regulation.
On the other hand, it is important that there not
be so many providing entities as to render the
regulatory process of oversight virtually
impossible by increasing the volume of
information to be collected, and the number of
determinations to be made.
In view of these considerations, it might
tentatively be said that the optimum number of
providing entities from a regulatory perspective
lies somewhere between 10 and 20, as is the case
in Chile where the 1977 reform process produced
13 regional entities to be regulated by the SSS.
At the other extreme lies the case of Colombia
where the CRA has jurisdiction over several
hundred municipalities. Where this sort of
structural situation arises, the regulatory agency
is necessarily forced either to take a much more
light-handed approach to regulation, or perhaps
to focus its efforts on the relatively small number
of larger service providers.
relatively low-income areas.
The Scope for Privatization
The discussion above indicated that competition
for the market has been the preferred mode of
private sector involvement in the Latin American
water and sanitation sector. Table 6 summarizes
the range of privatization mechanisms which are
available, and clarifies the allocation of
responsibilities between the private and public
sector implied in each case.
The franchising mechanisms associated with
competition for the market lie towards the more
modest end of the privatization spectrum,
implying a limited and well-defined role for the
private sector within a wider framework of public
service provision. This preference for franchising
measures has also been reflected in developing
country water privatization measures beyond
Latin America.  Examples are West Africa where
lease contracts and concessions have been widely
used, and in South East Asia where private
finance measures such as the BOT method have
been more prevalent. As illustrated in Table 7,
the experience of water sector privatization in
Latin America combines elements of both the
West African and South East Asian experience.12
Public Sector Responsibility Private Sector Responsibility















Table 7: Privatization Overview
Although the earliest privatization measures took relying on private finance for the construction of
the form of concessions and service contracts, water and waste water treatment plants under the
there has also been a move more recently towards BOT contractual form.
Table 6: Privatization Options









Note: BOO: Build/Own/Operate; BOT: Build/Operate/Transfer.
This overview of water privatization measures in Colombia and Venezuela proceeding at a slower
Latin America serves to highlight a number of pace.
important features of the experience.
Privatization activity has been concentrated in undertook a pilot lease contract in the provincial
some (although not all of) the larger countries of capital of Aguas Calientes, most countries have
the region, with countries such as Mexico, initiated their privatization measures in the
Argentina and Chile at the vanguard of metropolitan areas. Only later, have there been
experimentation, and countries such as Brazil, attempts to replicate measures in the provinces.
With the interesting exception of Mexico, which13
Figure 2: The Potential Vicious Circle of Privatization
With the exceptions of Mexico and Chile, which pattern of such activity is already informative.
have preferred more limited vehicles of Thus far, privatization measures have tended to
privatization such as service and lease contracts, be concentrated in those regions of those
most countries have opted for the concession as countries where sectoral and wider economic
the instrument of privatization. Such concessions conditions are already comparatively favorable.
allocate investment responsibilities to the private Over the next five years it seems likely that the
sector and involve the temporary transfer of asset experimentation will increasingly be extended to
ownership. rural areas, and smaller countries with less
Privatization measures have only been introduced
in the last five years, making it too early to begin This second wave of experiments will be critical
to judge the success of the policy. However, the in determining to what extent privatization can
failure of the proposed concession for Caracas genuinely be a solution to the problems faced by
provides some evidence that privatizations are the Latin American water sector. For, though
most likely to succeed in situations where: cost privatization offers an attractively radical
recovery rates are high; there is good information solution to the twin problems of confusion of
on the condition of the assets; and a clear roles and politicization of management, there is
regulatory framework can be agreed in advance. also the danger that privatization may present
Another lesson which has emerged from recent Latin American countries with something of a
experience is the potential for private contractors vicious circle, as illustrated in Figure 2.  That is
to bid up prices once the concession has been to say that, on the one hand, privatization is seen
awarded, as occurred in Buenos Aires. as the means of bringing about the improvements
In spite of the absence of a long experience with
which to evaluate private sector participation in
the Latin American water sector, the very 
favorable sectoral conditions.
required in the sector, while, on the other hand,
the sector cannot be made sufficiently attractive
to the private sector unless those same
improvements are brought about beforehand.14
Redesigning Social Policy
However, in practice it may be possible to break
out of this cycle. The experience of the Mexico
City water privatization illustrates that the
private sector itself can be used as the means of
bringing about the required sectoral
improvements, by utilizing an evolutionary multi-
stage contractual arrangement whereby the
private operator rectifies the fundamental
problems in return for playing a gradually
increasing role in the provision of the service. A
further, and more pragmatic, consideration is
that, in some cases the goal of privatization might
be the only politically effective catalyst for
motivating a country to undertake the painful
sectoral reforms which may, in any case, be
required.
The increasing role of private investors in the
provision of water and sewage services has, in
some countries, prompted a reconsideration of
the form of social policy towards the sector. An
analysis of the redistributive mechanisms often
used in the context of water provision, suggests
that most countries would be well-advised to
undertake a similar exercise, whether or not they
are considering privatization as an eventual
policy goal.
The most popular vehicle for acknowledging the
social characteristics of water and sanitation
services has been through cross-subsidies
incorporated, more or less explicitly, into the
tariff structure. These may take the form of
social levies on particular user groups, or of a
rising block tariff charging structure designed to
favor smaller consumers. 
Such empirical evidence as exists suggests that
these policy measures may not be particularly
helpful in assisting the most needy strata of
society. Specifically, cross-subsidies tend to be
quite regressive in nature. Studies of the ratio of
subsidies to the richest versus poorest income
quintile produced results of 2.5:1 for the
Dominican Republic and 1.25:1 in Costa Rica
and Argentina. The reason for this is fairly clear:
access to water networks is very regressively
distributed in Latin American countries. (For
example, in Peru over 90% of the top income
quintile have access to water supply, while less
than 40% of the lowest income quintile have
access). Since cross-subsidies can only reach
those who are already connected to the network,
they cannot be used to benefit the most
disadvantaged groups in society which are
typically not connected to the network.
The regressivity of water access is compounded
by the high prices charged by water vendors,
often the only source of water for urban
households which are not connected to the public
network. Studies have found that the ratio of the
unit price of water sold by vendors to the unit
price of the public water supply lies in the range
10:1–50:1 for Tegucigalpa and 10:1–100:1 for
Port au Prince (OXERA/World Bank, 1995).
Even taking into account the price elasticity of
demand, and the fact that public water supply is
typically priced well below economic cost, these
figures suggest that low-income households may
be spending more money on water than would be
the case if they were receiving a larger volume of
supply from the public network (even if the latter
were priced at full economic cost). The inference
is that low-income households do have a
relatively high willingness to pay for water
services, but may be prevented from accessing
the public network owing to credit constraints or
supply-side failures.
The reform of social policy toward the water and
sanitation sector needs to be based around the
answers to three fundamental questions.
< What is the objective of social policy
towards the water and sanitation sector?
< What source of funds will be used to
finance such social policy measures?
< What vehicle will be used to distribute
these funds to the target population?15











Use of Service Subsidies
Tariff Structure
Table 8: Options for the Design of Social Policy
As far as the objective of social policy is The first consideration is the absolute availability
concerned, this could be targeted either toward of funds from the two sources. A country with a
promoting access for those not currently large fiscal deficit may simply be precluded from
connected, or improving affordability for those making further claims on the public purse. A
currently connected. On the basis of the country with a low overall rate of water
discussion above, there may be quite a strong connections and/or a relatively high price
case for shifting the focus of social policy from elasticity of demand for water, may be limited in
affordability to access in countries with relatively the extent to which it can raise water bills to fund
low or regressively distributed rates of social policy.
connection.
Once the objective has been defined, it is of tax collection and tariff collection, which will
important to estimate the cost of the policy which depend on the comparative extent of evasion
will depend, among other things, on the number between tax payers and water consumers.
of households targeted by the policy, whether
urban, rural, or nationwide; and the level of
support provided, whether full or partial subsidy,
or subsidized credit. There are essentially two
sources of funds for a costed social policy
scheme: either general taxation, or other utility
service users. In a first best world, economic
theory suggests that social policy should be
funded from general taxation to avoid introducing
inefficient distortions into the pricing of public
services. However, since first best conditions are
unlikely to hold, three sets of considerations are
likely to be important in determining which of
these two sources of finance should be used for
the purpose of funding social policy measures.
The second consideration is the relative efficiency
The third consideration is the relative fairness of
the two modes of finance. If the tax system is
highly regressive, relying predominantly on sales
taxes rather than income taxes, it may be
inequitable to fund social policy from general
taxation. The converse argument would apply if
water tariffs display characteristics of high
regressivity.
When the objective has been fully costed and the
source of funding agreed, it remains to select the
instrument by which the funds are to be
distributed to the target population.  A number of
different policy instruments are identified in
Table 8: connection subsidies, connection credit16
schemes; use of service subsidies; and tariff distributed as a direct subsidy scheme for
structures. An important feature of Table 8 is the connections, as was the case in the Ivory Coast
fact that the source of finance is conceptually during the period of the National Water Plan
separated from the ultimate policy instrument. 1974–87 (OXERA/World Bank, 1995).
Thus, the fact that a social policy is funded
through taxation does not mean that the funds A three step procedure of the kind described
cannot ultimately be distributed through the tariff above should, where feasible, assist in ensuring
structure as a reduction in the bill of low-income that a country’s social policy toward the
users, as is the case in Chile. Similarly, the fact consumption of water and sanitation services is
that a social policy is funded through water bills both transparent and effective.
does not mean that the funds cannot ultimately be
Conclusion
In summary, this paper has performed three First, in devising policy toward the infrastructure
functions: sector in Latin America it is important to
< to provide—at the cross-sectoral
level—a tentative diagnosis of the
problems afflicting the public service
sector in Latin America and the
Caribbean;
< to identify those features of the water
and sanitation sector which differentiate
it from other public utility services, and
which merit special attention in the
context of a cross-sectoral policy
initiative; and
< to analyze each of the special features of
the water and sanitation sector identified,
with a view to characterizing the current
circumstances in Latin America, and
outlining the special economic issues
which arise and the options which may
exist for reform.
The principal conclusions which have emerged
from the paper are as follows:
distinguish between the problems afflicting the
sector, and the fundamental causes of those
problems. In this paper, it is hypothesized that
the latter can be characterized as the failure to
separate poachers from gamekeepers, and the
politicization of management.
Second, with the noteworthy exception of certain
“flagship” public sector providers of water
services, the Latin American water and sanitation
sector presents a picture of moderate but highly
heterogeneous rates of connection and low levels
of operational efficiency and cost recovery.
 Third, the key distinguishing characteristics of
the water and sanitation sector relative to other
public utilities are identified as the low ratio of
value to transportation costs making for highly
fragmented distribution networks; the virtual
absence of any scope for direct competition in the
market; and the strong social character of the
service as a result of positive social and negative
environmental externalities in consumption.17
Fourth, building on the analysis of the even those countries which are not compelled to
distinguishing characteristics of the water and reconsider their social policy as a result of some
sanitation sector, the key economic issues facing privatization initiative would nonetheless benefit
the industry in Latin America are the degree to from fundamental reforms. Such reforms should
which operations should be centralized or be based on the answers to three key questions
decentralized; the extent to which competition for regarding the objectives of social policy; the
the market can be effectively used to bring about sources of funding, and the instruments of
sectoral improvements; and the scope for the implementation. There is some empirical
reform of social policy towards the consumption evidence to suggest that traditional social policy
of water and sanitation services. has focused excessively on the issue of
Fifth, as far as the optimal horizontal structure of
the industry is concerned, the analysis suggests
that this is a multidimensional question which
goes beyond the traditional considerations of Finally, the overall thrust of the paper is,
operational and managerial efficiency to perhaps, best summarized diagrammatically in
encompass the wider issues associated with Figure 3 which outlines the sequence of decisions
environmental management; private sector to be taken in any country contemplating reform
participation; investment finance; regulatory of the water and sanitation sector. Figure 3
control and social policy. stresses that:
Sixth, analysis of the role of competition for the < structural issues must be settled in
market shows that experiments to date have been advance of ownership issues;
largely confined to the metropolitan areas of the
larger countries in the region where economic and
sectoral conditions are comparatively favorable.
As these privatization experiments are extended
to smaller countries and rural areas, it will be
important to evaluate the extent to which
privatization can actually bring about sectoral
improvements, rather than necessitating them as
a prerequisite for successful implementation.
Seventh, analysis of social policy suggests that
affordability to existing users, at the expense of
promoting access to those not yet connected to
the network.
< privatization measures should be
considered as lying on a continuum as
opposed to constituting an all-or-nothing
choice; and
< regulation is likely to have a role to play,
even where privatization measures are
not considered to be feasible or desirable
in the short and medium term.18
Figure 3: A Possible Public Utility Reform Strategy19
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